As I was preparing for my fireside chat with Dmitri Alperovitch, Founder and Former CTO of CrowdStrike and Executive Chairman of the Silverado Policy Accelerator, for the Google Cloud Government Security Summit taking place on Tuesday, July 20th, I was reflecting about recent developments in cybersecurity, Zero Trust best practices – including aspects of Google’s journey – and the benefits that this approach to cybersecurity brings to the public sector. 

As Dmitri and I discussed what we wanted to share during our session at the Government Security Summit, I quickly realized how pertinent the information was to our public sector audience. For that reason, ahead of Tuesday’s event, I wanted to give you a glimpse of what is to come in our fireside chat. Read below for an exclusive preview of what we plan to discuss. If you are planning to attend on Tuesday, we encourage you to ask questions through our interactive chat function and sign up for 1:1 time with our Ask the Expert program. 

Check out my chat with Dmitri below…

Heather: What do you see as the most significant changes in both the attack surface and cybercriminal tactics in recent years? And why do these changes present unprecedented challenges for public sector? 

Dmitri: In terms of the threat landscape, the more things change, the more they stay the same. The adversaries haven’t changed that much. It’s actually striking. Not all threats are emanating from governments or state actors – either directly or by providing safe harbor to criminals – but a large portion are. That has not changed. The volume and scale of attacks have grown, however, and become massive. And now, the greatest challenge is that everyone is a target. Before, only top-end institutions and government organizations were facing nation state threats. That has changed either through targeted attacks or accidental ones, such as WannaCry. The question now is “How do we protect the most vulnerable and extend much-needed protection to smaller organizations that do not have deep security expertise or resources?”

Heather: Earlier this year, the Biden Administration released its Cybersecurity Executive Order (EO). What do you see as the most important takeaways and potential impact of the EO? 

Dmitri: The Cybersecurity EO is set to have a significant impact. The biggest change is a shift in strategy. For many decades, we all had the mentality that we have to keep attackers out of the network. That is great in theory, but we all know that it is a virtual impossibility with a network of any significant size. Adversaries will find a way in. And, we used to think it was game over once they were in the network.

Then about 10 years ago, we began to see a change. Google led the way with its BeyondCorp strategy as did Lockheed Martin with its sentinel Kill Chain framework. Now, when an adversary penetrates a network, it’s not the end of the game, but the beginning. That is the case if the organization is prepared with a network architecture built around Zero Trust principles. The adversary now has to move laterally, steal credentials, and elevate privileges to get to the resources they want. A Zero Trust architecture can slow them down and give organizations time to detect and eject adversaries from the network. The EO recognizes the power of this approach and has made Zero Trust its fundamental tenet.

Heather: Federal agencies have spent the last 60 days looking at Zero Trust and developing their plans. What do you hope to see? What is critical to accelerating implementation?

Dmitri: The EO establishes a very ambitious timeline, and the US government is not known to move rapidly due to a number of restrictions and considerations. That said, the EO recognizes the idea that logging has to be at the center of modern architecture. Agencies need full visibility into what is going on at endpoints and across the network, have to hunt continuously across networks for adversaries, and must work to rapidly eject them. That is at the core of the EO, and it is a great shift. The private sector should be watching and learning as well.

Heather: What pitfalls should the Federal government look out for in moving forward to implement the EO?

Dmitri: One of the main challenges is the limited authority of the President. Congress is the only branch with the power to change the laws. While the establishment of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) a few years ago allows for hunting across agency networks, CISA still has limited authority. It cannot manage the cybersecurity of more than 120 civilian agencies.

Some agencies are performing well when it comes to security, but we have to recognize that this is not the norm. Not all agencies have the capacity to recruit the best cybersecurity talent, but their needs may be just as great. We need to centralize capabilities and leverage the cloud, like Google, to provide all agencies with the best cyber talent and resources.

Join us at the Google Cloud Government Security Summit to hear the rest of our conversation. The event is complimentary. Register today to reserve your spot on July 20th. If you have any questions about the event, please reach out to us at cloudsummitsupport@google.com.

The concept of “shifting left” has been widely promoted in the software development lifecycle. The concept is that introducing security earlier, or leftwards, in the development process will lead to fewer software-related security defects later, or rightwards, in production.

Shifting cloud security left can help identify potential misconfigurations earlier in the development cycle, which if unresolved can lead to security defects. Catching those misconfigurations early can improve the security posture of production deployments.

Why shifting security left matters

Google’s DevOps Research and Assessment (DORA) highlights the importance of integrating security into DevOps in the 2016 State of DevOps Report. The report discussed the placement of security testing in the software development lifecycle. The survey found that most security testing and tool usage happened after the development of a release, rather than continuously throughout the development lifecycle. This led to increased costs and friction because remediating problems found in testing may involve big architectural changes and additional integration testing, as shown in Figure 1. For example, security defects in production can lead to GDPR violations, which can carry fines up to 4% of global annual revenue.

By inserting security testing into the development phase, we can identify security defects earlier and perform the appropriate remediation sooner. This results in fewer defects post-production and reduces remediation efforts and architectural changes. Figure 2 shows us that integrating security earlier in the SDLC results in overall decreases in security defects and associated remediation costs.

The 2021 State of DevOps Report expands the work of the 2016 report and advocates for integrating automated testing throughout the software development lifecycle. Automated testing is useful for continuously testing development code without the need for additional skills or intervention by the developer. Developers can continue to iterate quickly while other stakeholders can be confident that common defects are being identified and remediated.

From code to cloud

The DORA findings with regard to code security can also be applied to cloud infrastructure security. As more organizations deploy their workloads to the cloud, it’s important to test the security and configurations of cloud infrastructure. Misconfigurations in cloud resources can lead toward security incidents that could lead to data theft. Examples of such misconfigurations include overly permissive firewall rules, public IP addresses for VMs, or excessive Identity and Access Management (IAM) permissions on service accounts and storage buckets.

We can and should leverage different Google Cloud services to identify these misconfigurations early in the development process and prevent such errors from emerging in production to reduce the costs of future remediation, potential legal fines, and compromised customer trust.

The key tools in our toolshed are Security Command Center and Cloud Build. Security Command Center provides visibility into misconfigurations, vulnerabilities, and threats within a Google Cloud organization. This information is critical when protecting your cloud infrastructure (such as virtual machines, containers, web applications) against threats, or identifying potential gaps from compliance frameworks (such as CIS Benchmarks, PCI-DSS, NIST 800-53, or ISO 27001.

Security Command Center further supports shifting security left by allowing visibility of security findings at the cloud project level for individual developers, while still allowing global visibility for Security Operations. Cloud Build provides for the creation of cloud-native CI/CD pipelines. You can insert custom health checks into a pipeline to evaluate certain conditions (such as security metrics) and fail the pipeline when irregularities are detected. We will now explore two use cases that take advantage of these tools.

Security Health Checker

Security Health Checker continuously monitors the security health of a Google Cloud project and promptly notifies project members of security findings. Figure 3 shows developers interacting with a Google Cloud environment with network, compute, and database components. Security Command Center is configured to monitor the health of the project.

When Security Command Center identifies findings, it sends them to a Cloud Pub/Sub topic. A Cloud Function then takes the findings published to that topic and sends them to a Slack channel monitored by infrastructure developers. Just like a spell checker providing quick feedback on misspellings, Security Health Checker provides prompt feedback on security misconfigurations in a Google Cloud project that could lead to deployment failures or post-production compromises. No additional effort is required on the part of developers.

Security Pipeline Checker

In addition to using Security Command Center for timely notification of security concerns during the development process, we can also integrate security checks into the CI/CD pipeline by using Security Command Center along with Cloud Build as shown in Figure 4.

The pipeline begins with a developer checking code into a git repository. This repository is mirrored to Cloud Source Repositories. A build trigger will begin the build process. The build pipeline will include a short waiting period of a few minutes to give Security Command Center a chance to identify security vulnerabilities. A brief delay may appear undesirable at first, but the analysis that takes place during that interval can result in the reduction of security defects post-production.

At the end of the waiting period, a Cloud Function serving as a Security Health Checker will evaluate the findings from Security Command Center (Connector 1 in Figure 4). If the validator determines that unacceptable security findings exist, the validator will inject a failure indication into the pipeline to terminate the build process (Connector 2 in Figure 4). Developers have visibility into the failure triggers and remediate them before successfully deploying code to production. This is in contrast to the findings in the 2016 State of DevOps Report wherein organizations that didn’t integrate security into their DevOps processes spent 50% more time remediating security issues than those who “shifted left” on security.

Closing thoughts

DORA’s 2016 State of DevOps report called out the need for “shifting left” with security, introducing security earlier in the development process to identify security vulnerabilities early to reduce mitigation efforts post-production. The report also advocated for automated testing throughout the software development lifecycle.

We looked at two ways of achieving these objectives in Google Cloud. The Security Health Checker provides feedback to developers using Security Command Center and Slack to notify developers of security findings as they pursue their development activities. The Security Pipeline Checker uses Security Command Center as part of a Cloud Build pipeline to terminate a build pipeline if vulnerabilities are identified during the build process. To implement the Security Heath Checker and the Security Pipeline Checker, check out the GitHub repository. We hope these examples will help you to “shift left” using Google Cloud services. Happy coding!

This article was co-authored with Jason Bisson, Bakh Inamov, Jeff Levne, Lanre Ogunmola, Luis Urena, and Holly Willey, Security & Compliance Specialists at Google Cloud.

Our quarterly Security Talks series brings together experts from Google Cloud Security teams and the industry to share information on our latest security products, innovations and best practices. Below is an introduction to Mandiant’s Security Talks presentation on Dec. 7, Mandiant Tales from the Front Lines: Activate Cyber Defenses Against Supply Chain Compromise.

The discovery in December 2020 of the SolarWinds supply chain compromise, a global computer intrusion campaign, caused organizations and security leaders to completely reassess their Cyber Threat Profiles, risk assessments, and defensive postures. It was a rare, watershed event that savvy security leaders and IT decision makers have been using to improve how security teams protect systems, networks, and data across industries and sectors, especially critical infrastructure. Two years later, we’re looking back at the security incident, what we’ve learned, and how it continues to drive change across security teams and organizations.

The SolarWinds compromise leveraged access to the software maker’s Orion business software in order to distribute a malicious update containing malware. Mandiant has since attributed this operation to APT29, a Russia-based espionage group assessed to be sponsored by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). This operation afforded APT29 with unparalleled access to an estimated 18,000 global organizations for follow-on targeting based on the attacker’s discretion and collection priorities.

While the security industry has yet to see anything that rivals the scale and scope of the SolarWinds compromise since it was discovered, a recent Google Cloud research report on software supply chain security found that there’s been a sharp increase in software supply chain attacks across nearly every sector.

Mandiant analysis identified supply chain compromise as the second-most prevalent initial infection vector in 2021. When the initial infection vector was identified, supply chain compromise accounted for 17% of intrusions in 2021 compared to less than 1% of intrusions in 2020. Further, 86% of supply chain compromise intrusions in 2021 were related to the SolarWinds breach.

Since 2020, Mandiant has also observed an increase in financially-motivated threat actors targeting the software supply chain. These actors compromised popular software packages and even mobile applications in order to deploy ransomware, cryptocurrency miners, and banking trojans. In one case, malicious code was inserted into a popular package, prompting the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) to issue an alert about the compromise.

Mitigation recommendations

The discovery of the SolarWinds incident resulted in increased global attention around supply chain compromise threats. Government authorities and technology organizations have responded with several initiatives, legislation, and studies seeking to reduce software supply chain and software dependency risk. Although these initiatives may make it more difficult for threat actors to conduct these operations, organizations should also take steps to mitigate supply chain threats.

Mandiant suggests that organizations contemplate applying multiple layers of security policies, plans, and solutions to maximize opportunities to provide early threat detection and prevent an anomaly or compromise stemming from the supply chain. This guidance is aligned with best practices Google Cloud has recommended for organizations to improve their software supply chain security.

Mandiant has also provided the following additional recommendations for organizations to consider more generally:

• Establish a vendor vetting process to evaluate vendor security practices before deploying hardware or software.
• Create a change control process and board for all enterprise hardware and software changes, which could include a centralized IT or IT security managed process for downloading, testing, and pushing updates to users.
• Use an advanced endpoint security solution, such as an endpoint detection and response (EDR), to detect malicious behavior when a tainted software package is downloaded and executed.
• Ensure proper logging and monitoring is in place between the software, hardware, and the internet.
• Implement the software and hardware using network segmentation with minimal access to the internet.
• Enact employee training programs and policies to encourage security best practices, including security audits of code in development.

Next steps

You can watch the Google Cloud Security Talks presentation on SolarWinds and the current state of supply chain threats here. You can learn more about Google Cloud’s solutions to help improve software supply chain security here, or for more general inquiries, please contact us or reach out to your sales representative to learn how we can assist.